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Risking Innovation. Understanding risk and public service 
innovation - evidence from a four nation study 
Introduction 
Innovation is a risky business1. Outcomes are uncertain and/or unknown (Van de Ven et al 
2008). This is as true for the public as for the private sector (NESTA 2013). In a time of 
austerity, governments increasingly demand innovation as a route to efficient and effective 
public service delivery (e.g. DIUS, 2008). However previous research has demonstrated 
that public policy remains almost silent on the role that risk plays in innovation in public 
services, and on how best public service managers can engage with it (Osborne & Brown 
2013, Flemig et al 2016). This prior work produced useful conceptual clarification on the 
nature of risk in public service innovation (PSI), but to date there has been no empirical 
exploration of it. This paper addresses this gap and considers its import for theory and 
practice.  
 
Indeed, risk in PSI is an important issue for public management. It not only has significant 
cost and health and safety implications for public services, but is also central to the impact 
of such PSIs upon the quality and effectiveness of public services themselves. Moreover, 
a failure to engage with the risks that PSI entails not only endangers their successful 
                                                        
1 The research that forms the basis of this paper was conducted as Working Package 4 of the 
European Commission’s ‘Learning from Innovation in Public Service Environments (LIPSE) FP7 
research programme. 
implementation but also can lead to resistance from public service users and staff – which 
can further jeopardise the potential benefits of such PSIs.  
 
The paper is in four parts. The first part explicates a conceptual framework from the 
existing literature on risk and PSI and part two sets out its methodology. Part three 
summarises the findings of the research. The final part uses this data to drive forward our 
understanding of risk and PSI. 
The Literature 
Innovation is an often elusive topic in public service research. For example, at times it can 
include both the invention of new knowledge and its application, whist at other times it is 
limited to implementation alone; it can refer to processes both within one organisation 
alone (subjective innovation) and across a service field (objective innovation); and there is 
an on-going debate as to whether it is solely a disruptive process or if it can be an 
incremental one also. (Osborne 1998, Osborne & Brown 2011).  We define innovation as 
“the intentional introduction and application …of ideas, processes, products or procedures, 
new to the relevant unit of adoption” (West & Farr 1990). Moreover, innovation is 
differentiated from incremental change because it is “a distinctive category of 
discontinuous change that offers special challenges” (Brown & Osborne, 2013). 
 
There is a substantive innovation studies literature that this study is embedded within (Van 
de Ven et al 1989, Langley et al 2013), as well as a distinctive risk governance literature 
(Barsh & Capozzi 2008, Rosa et al 2013). This literature emphasise that risk and innovation 
are socially constructed terms (Weick 1995). Consequently, we define risk as the 
probability that an undesired but previously identified outcome materialises (Tversky & 
Fox 1995). It thus denotes outcomes that are known and can be addressed (potentially). 
They can include financial risk (a monetary loss), risk to service users (an adverse reactions 
to a new medical treatment), and/or reputational risk for public service organisations 
(PSOs) and others involved in the innovation process (bad press coverage about a new 
innovative policy) (Brown & Osborne 2013).  Uncertainty refers to the residual likelihood 
that a completely unforeseen outcome occurs as a consequence of the innovation process. 
Risk governance seeks to minimise the likelihood of such uncertainty (Renn 2008). 
 
Whilst the innovation studies literature emphasises that risk is inherent to innovation, it is 
under-researched in the PSI literature. Only a handful of studies have focussed on it 
(Vincent 1996, Hood 2000, Lodge, 2009, Brown & Osborne 2013, Borins 2014). This 
limited literature was reviewed and evaluated by this research team initially, prior to the 
commencement of the research component of this study. This review has been reported 
elsewhere (Flemig et al 2016) and will not be repeated here. This review identified the 
work of Lodge (2009) and Brown & Osborne (2013), together with that of Renn (2008) in 
the field of risk governance, as the most significant conceptual developments in the field 
over the last decade. Consequently, this subsequent work seeks to test out the insights of 
this work through empirical research.  
 
Flemig et al (2016) highlighted the hegemony of actuarial and/or health and safety 
approaches to risk in PSI and a consequent emphasis on risk minimisation or management 
rather than a more relational risk governance approach – the latter approach developed in 
the seminal work of Renn (2008). It also noted the limited nature of public policy guidance 
to public service managers beyond assertions that risk should be ‘fully discussed and 
understood’ and that PSOs should take a ‘proportionate approach’ to it (DoH 2010). 
 
Lodge (2009, p. 401) argues for risk as a social construct and identifies ‘four world-views’ 
of it, albeit without a focus on PSI: fatalism (risk is uncontrollable), hierarchy (risk control 
requires centralisation), individualism (risk requires trial-and-error style learning), and 
egalitarianism (risk control requires collective decision-making). He associates these with 
four ‘instruments’ - randomness, oversight, rivalry, and mutuality, respectively. The 
arising ‘plurality of solutions’ may not clarify for public managers precisely how to address 
risk in PSI, but Lodge concludes that deliberation about these conflicting world-views and 
instruments is intrinsically valuable. 
 
Building on Lodge and Renn, and the broader innovation studies, Brown & Osborne (2013) 
subsequently proposed a holistic conceptual framework for risk governance and PSI (Table 
I). This was an important development because the limited prior literature had lacked such 
conceptual clarity and tools to enable its evaluation.  The framework integrated the three 
approaches to risk which Renn (2008) termed technocratic (professional), decisionistic 
(political), and transparent (stakeholder) governance, together with the three types of 
innovation previously defined by Osborne (1998) – expansionary (serving a new need), 
evolutionary (using a new approach) and total (doing both).  
 
 
Mode of Risk 
Governance/ 
Type of Innovation 
Risk Minimisation 
(technocratic) 
Risk Analysis 
(decisionistic) 
Risk Negotiation 
(transparent 
governance) 
Evolutionary X X X 
Expansionary  X X 
Total   X 
Table I 
Brown & Osborne (2013) framework for risk governance and public service innovation 
 
Combining these with Andreeva’s (2014) conceptualisation of hard’ 
(technocratic/regulation-driven) and ‘soft’ risk management (communication-
based/relational), Author (2016) argued that soft approaches can often be the most 
appropriate ways through which to manage risk in PSI. However, caution was urged that 
soft approaches not only involve the greatest potential benefits from PSI but also the 
highest potential risk of failure, because of their complexity and diffuseness. Consequently 
it was argued to be important to build opportunities for learning into PSI processes, to learn 
from the experience for the future governance of PSIs (Kinder 2010). The utility of these 
conceptual frameworks was explored further in this present study. 
 
Methodology 
Given the lack of empirical data on risk in PSI, the goal of this research was exploratory. 
The study adopted a qualitative approach that combined documents, exploratory survey 
data and personal interview within a case study framework. 
 
Over-reliance on personal interviews in such research can lead to reporting bias. However, 
our triangulation strategy (Denzin 2006) addressed this bias. Conceptual triangulation was 
employed in the initial literature review to evaluate alternative conceptual frameworks and 
their import for the empirical findings of this study.  Methodological triangulation was 
pursued through multiple methods (exploratory survey, case study data and documentary 
analysis) to ensure no over-reliance on one method and to examine the research themes 
from these different perspectives. The survey and interview data in particular were 
compared for areas of inconsistency and complexity. Finally data triangulation was 
employed (across policy sectors/organisational levels, as well as managers/politicians) to 
ensure that no one perspective dominated and that competing and complementary 
viewpoints within and across PSOs and policy fields could be captured (Scandura & 
Williams 2000, Flick 2004).  
Case Selection. The study followed a multi-method comparative case-study design (Yin 
2013). Two policy areas were identified that contrasted ‘soft’ procedural innovation with 
‘hard’, often capital intensive, projects: mental health (‘soft’ innovation) and 
environmental sustainability (‘hard’ innovation). The research team believed that it was 
important to explore these elements as part of the understanding of risk in PSI. Four 
national cases were also chosen to represent differing state – public service configurations: 
Italy as a unitary Mediterranean state with a high degree of legalism and complex ongoing 
processes of decentralisation; Netherlands as a northern European decentralized unitary 
state, with relatively strong and autonomous local regions;   Slovakia as a centralised 
unitary state in eastern Europe with relatively weak local government; and United Kingdom 
(UK) as a western Europe decentralised, quasi-federal state, with comparatively weaker 
local government structure compared to the other nations in the study2. 
 
Research questions and research methods/data sources. The study pursued four research 
objectives to identify: the current range of approaches to risk in PSI, their key 
contingencies, their approaches to stakeholder engagement in decision-making on PSI, and 
the translation mechanisms for these issues into specific risk management and governance 
approaches. Consequently these research objectives were operationalised into five research 
questions: 
 
                                                        
2 It is important to note that the UK itself is a difficult and contested concept. It is currently a state 
composed of 4 national regions – England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The majority of 
domestic policy issues are devolved to the regional governments of these 4 national regions, 
including health. The research here was conducted in Scotland in the context of NHS Scotland. 
Scotland is probably the most bifurcated of the 4 national regions with a very strong national 
government compared to the weaker local government and health service agencies (Keating 2010, 
Greer 2008).. 
• RQ1: What is the range of approaches to risk in PSI? 
• RQ2: What are the key contingencies of effective risk governance in PSI?  
• RQ3: What are the approaches to stakeholder engagement about appropriate levels 
of risk for PSI? 
• RQ4: How are these discussions translated subsequently into specific risk 
management/governance models? 
• RQ5: What are relevant principles for effective risk governance in PSI? 
 
An initial exploratory survey was conducted within these cases, entailing 200 invitations 
in each country (100 for each policy case) – 800 in total. This was intended to scope out 
the area of investigation and to structure the subsequent qualitative investigations. The 
survey included a mix of open and closed questions. The questions contained in the survey 
were for two purposes. First they were intended to explore the understanding of risk and 
its impact upon PSI held by respondents, by a series of open-ended questions. Second they 
were intended to interrogate the conceptual framework for this research project developed 
in Flemig et al (2016) and derived from the work of Lodge (2009) and Brown & Osborne 
(2013). This framework was embodied in the 5 research questions identified above, each 
of which formed part of the survey (and the case studies). This was a mixture of open and 
closed questions, with the latter limited to binary ‘yes – no’ alternatives rather than multi-
point Likert Scales. 
 
The survey was directed to managers with responsibility for direct service provision within 
each PSO and policymakers (local and/or national politicians). In each country, 4 research 
sites (public service organisations [PSO]) were identified. The survey was administered 
within the four policy fields identified with the active support, and encouragement of 
participation, from senior managers/politicians in each PSO, to enable a strong response 
rate. This approach yielded 657 useable responses (82%) - derived from a mixture of 
interviews (in-person and by phone), postal and online survey administration. Whilst this 
approach did introduce a modicum of variability into the data collection, this was balanced, 
we believed, by its success in enabling a high response rate to the survey. Further the nature 
of the survey was entirely exploratory with the key themes which emerged being pursued 
subsequently in the subsequent qualitative case studies.  
 
Based on this exploratory survey, each national team selected two case examples per policy 
field (Tables II and III). The teams conducted 6 - 8 interviews for each case example, 
resulting in 104 interviews across the four countries and two policy areas. These were 
supplemented by analysis of available relevant documents and policies. 
  
Country Case 1 Case 2 
Italy Family counselling service Mental health charity 
Netherlands Non-profit mental health 
foundation 
Non-profit mental health 
organisation 
Slovakia Mental health charity Psychiatric hospital 
United 
Kingdom 
Mental health charity  
(Regional Chapter) 
Local government mental health 
team 
Table II: Micro-cases from the policy field “mental health”. 
Country Case 1 Case 2 
Italy Community-based energy 
cooperative 
Community-based energy 
cooperative 
Netherlands Community-based energy 
cooperative 
Community-based energy 
cooperative 
Slovakia Municipal cooperative 
bioenergy provider 
Municipal energy company 
United 
Kingdom 
Habitat restoration charity University building and estate 
management service  
Table III: micro cases from the policy field “sustainability” 
Findings 
Italy. In the two policy areas under analysis, institutional responsibility in the area of 
environmental sustainability was predominantly located at the central level, whilst 
responsibility for mental health services had been shifted to the regional local health 
authorities. Third sector organisations (TSOs) were very active in both policy areas, though 
with more apparent encouragement to innovate in the field of environmental sustainability. 
Innovations in environmental sustainability included integrated business and social 
models, such as the purchase of energy from a ‘responsible provider’, or redistributive 
action through ‘energy vouchers’ - as well as the promotion a new approach to 
environmental sustainability by raising the awareness and skills needed to assess the ‘life 
cycle of products’. In mental health they focused on either changes to organizational 
structures and collaboration across departments, or innovations in existing services by 
widening them to new clusters of patients (e.g. refugees or homeless) and/or by changing 
their delivery mode (e.g. inclusion of former patients in the process of cure and support) – 
expansionary and evolutionary innovation in the typology of innovation above. 
 
In the area of environmental sustainability it was possible to cluster the types of risk 
according to the actors involved. For example, TSOs often perceived risk as ‘symbolic’ 
and connected to the legitimacy of a PSO. They frequently mentioned external reputational 
risk as a key issue. In contrast co-operatives perceived more risks in relation to regulation 
- primarily because renewable energy is highly regulated in Italy where government 
incentives determine market opportunities and market shares. It also reflected the 
vicissitudes of the Italian administrative setting, characterised as a legalistic system with 
political instability. As one informant observed:  
 
‘It is complicated to predict the availability of sun, especially in the short run […] 
but it’s even harder to predict what will happen to the government and to the 
regulation in place!’ (manager of a Community-based energy cooperative). 
 
In the mental health sector, most respondents equated risk with clinical/professional risks 
and focused upon the existence of systems to identify them in PSIs. This perhaps explained 
the relatively high rate (76%) of respondents affirming to have systems and strategies in 
place to identify innovation risks– but which identified these as clinical risks alone. 
 
‘What is perhaps most risky is the possibility to commit mistakes in the diagnosis’. 
(psychologist in a family counselling centre). 
 
‘I often think about the risk of suicide of the patient or without getting there even 
the risk of the patient of developing a psychosis’. (psychiatrist in a mental health 
care charity). 
Moreover, monitoring and protocols were employed almost exclusively to assess clinical 
risk only. Given this, it was not surprising that respondents identified risk to and by patients 
(e.g. to service delivery staff) as the most important ones.  
 
The second most significant risk in mental health services was identified as the results of 
resistance to innovation at the organizational level. (cited by 64 respondents in total). This 
could either be internal, by organizational staff, or external, by key stakeholders and/or the 
community at large. Some respondents also referred to ‘ideological resistance’, especially 
when the prevailing treatment paradigm was threatened by an innovation (such as a social 
rather than medical model of psychiatric treatment). 
 
Finally we found ad-hoc responses to innovation-related risks were common – though, 
unsurprisingly, the larger the organisational size, the more structured were its risk 
management systems. Common informal practices included frequent meetings of 
organisational Boards to discuss the impact of an innovation or to anticipate changes that 
might impact upon the outcome of an innovation. Additionally, respondents reported 
relying heavily on their individual professional skills, knowledge and experience to try to 
mitigate these risks. A final approach to risk management entailed diversification, through 
the encouragement of different PSIs, in order to spread or mitigate PSI risks. 
 
Netherlands. In neither policy field did respondents express a clear understanding of the 
concept of ‘risk’ and most defined it on the basis of operational practices: 
 ‘Much was developed in practice. As a psychologist I was not very much concerned 
with risks, only with how everything could be developed and adapted.  In the first 
three-quarters of the year, we gradually found out how to manage things.’ 
(Psychologist in a mental health institution). 
In mental health services, managers identified both organisational risks (e.g. funding, 
buildings, professional workloads, and a lack of clear responsibilities) and human risks 
(especially the failure to diagnose clients correctly and privacy issues). Professionals 
particularly mentioned a failure to build an effective relationship with clients within PSIs, 
especially digital ones:  
‘Patients can hide behind digital instruments. Non-verbal reactions are invisible. 
This is why, even with blended treatments, we use a face-to-face intake.’ (manager 
in health care). 
‘The knowledge of software programmes is sometimes deficient. It’s necessary to 
read up, become experienced in using it. It’s difficult to handle. We should pay 
more attention to practical problems.’ (psychologist).    
In environmental sustainability, institutional risks were consistently mentioned as a top 
priority (particularly having to deal with citizens/volunteers who lacked the necessary skills 
to negotiate a complex service model, or who were apathetic to and/or resisted a PSI), as 
well as financial vulnerability.  
‘Government is very unreliable. We invest for 20-30 years, but government can’t 
think beyond four. For instance, there’s this subsidy that’s depleted every time, and 
next year there will be something different.’ (Chairman of an environmental 
cooperative).  
‘(The cooperative) are doing well, but it’s hard for them to find members. People 
rarely switch between energy providers. They cannot compete on advertising, so 
they have to use other means. (…) Bottom-up recruitment, small steps, school 
activities for children, mouth-to-mouth, car-sharing.’ (Local councillor).  
However, such awareness did not necessarily translate into articulated risk management 
tools or strategies. Both the interviews and online survey indicated the absence of formal 
such strategies. The dominant ‘strategy’ reported was to use ‘common sense’ or to rely on 
a pragmatic mind-set and professional skills in problem-solving. Insofar as formal 
strategies were identified, these related primarily to communication and consultation. 
There was an expressed belief that better communication would help to overcome apathy 
and resistance and that consultation could solve all problems - arguably a time-honoured 
Dutch approach to any problem. However, few examples of this in practice were identified 
by respondents.    
Within the mental health field there was hence a strong culture of professionalism and a 
confidence that professional expertise and internal peer-review would resolve most 
problems. PSIs were thus handled through informal trial-and-error, with little attention to 
prior risk assessment, or subsequent formal evaluation. Where formal protocols had been 
developed at the managerial level they were barely known by professionals. Strong 
professional cultures appeared to militate against organisational/formalised approached to 
PSI.   
Whilst the environmental sustainability initiatives were primarily citizens’ organisations, 
compared to the larger more professionalised mental health bodies, nonetheless the 
approach to risk was strikingly similar. There was again little in the way of formal risk 
management, though here it reflected the loose and informal nature of the organisations 
involved and their networks. These citizens’ organisations relied on a mixture of 
proceeding carefully and incrementally, and maintaining an on-going dialogue on potential 
risks; depending on personal experience and expertise within the team, and often from 
highly educated board members; and careful planning and analysis. ‘Common sense’ and 
‘experience’ were again cited as the most common strategies for dealing with risk in 
innovation. 
 
Slovakia.  The PSIs in mental health services concerned ‘technical’ innovations, such as 
new drugs or therapies. Innovations within public bodies were invariably top-down, 
emanating from central or local governments or national funding/regulatory bodies (e.g. 
insurance providers). For TSOs, the creation of the TSO itself was often the innovation 
(e.g. Divadlo z pasaze {‘Passage Theatre}, where theatre was used as a therapeutic tool). 
By contrast the environmental field was more differentiated. Innovations here included the 
use of renewable energy sources (RES), new technologies (including IT), novel ways of 
saving energy, strategic approaches to and analysis of the use of RES, and education on 
saving energy through RES. 
 
Respondents evidenced divergence to understanding risk within both fields. In mental 
health services, respondents rarely made a connection between risk and innovation, 
possibly explained by the reported paucity of PSIs in Slovakia in general. When risks were 
identified they related usually to either financial risks or the physical risk from aggressive 
patients:  
‘Anything, including innovations, resulting into the cost increase means the risk 
that such expenses will not be reimbursed by health insurance companies.’ 
(Hronovce, financial manager). 
 
‘The issue of aggressive patients is the core problem for public mental health care 
hospitals. We do not have to serve only the patients from ambulatory 
establishments, but also criminals with ordered mental health care treatment.’ 
(Director, Kremnica psychiatric hospital) 
 
Where risk management strategies existed in mental health services, they consistently took 
the form of top-down bureaucratic regulation. Slovakian public services are dominated by 
national governmental organisations with a strong public sector orientation. In this context, 
risk management followed governmental guidelines. A limited number of TSOs were 
involved, and they had no independence from governmental supervision in responding to 
risk and innovation. 
 
In environmental services three types of risk were identified. These were procedural risk 
(from bureaucratic procedures and public procurement), technical risks of the use of new 
technologies and the instability of RES as an energy source, and environmental risk (e.g. 
environmental accidents and the impact of PSIs on citizens living in particular areas). 
Engagement with these risks was limited. In the stark words of one respondent (TSO 
service provider) ‘[w]e do not do any risk management in a strict sense, we do not manage 
risks’. Where it did occur, mostly in the public sector, it replicated the mental health model 
of top down bureaucratic risk management. As one respondent (chief accountant in public 
sector services provider) stated ‘risk management is in the hands of mayors and particular 
committees within our local district council.’ Another respondent, a council leader in one 
of the municipalities in environmental services association affirmed that ‘if there is a 
problem, we get in touch immediately with the statutory representative.’ Employees at 
lower organisational levels were hardly involved in the governance of risk in PSIs. 
UK.  As in the other countries, respondents had an uncertain grasp of both risk and PSI. 
When asked whether they could define what innovation and risk meant for their 
organisations, a strong majority of respondents failed to deliver a definition for either. ‘This 
is not something I would think about in my daily work’, said one frontline mental health 
worker. Middle to senior management had received most formal training and were more 
overtly confident on these matters. ‘We do regular risk assessments before and during 
innovative projects and keep risk logs online…’ said one team leader in a statutory body, 
‘…[w]e usually follow a standard project management approach around the regulatory 
risks.’  
 
Such confidence was not widespread though. One programme manager stated that ‘senior 
management struggle with risk all the time’, finding it hard ‘to balance benefits and 
potential detriment’. Where they identified approaches to risk, respondents focused 
primarily on legal and regulatory standards that had been set by national governments or 
regulatory bodies, invariably from a health and safety perspective. Respondents also 
referenced ‘good communication’ and a ‘need to include all stakeholders’, though these 
appeared to be top-down bodies rather than frontline staff or service users. 
 
Informal and bottom-up appreciations of risk dominated in both policy fields. These were 
not identified a risk management though, but rather as ‘common sense’.   Professional 
sharing of techniques and strategies was thus more common than formal efforts to 
introduce systemic approaches to risk, even when mandated by legal and regulatory 
standards. These included best practices being informally shared among local and regional 
colleagues on an anecdotal basis, but very little effort by senior management to harness the 
strength of these insights in any methodical way. No evidence was found of attempts to 
learn from innovation failures as a positive process. This combination of a lack of 
understanding of risk and an informal approach to its management was perceived by many 
respondents as stifling PSI across both policy fields.  
 
A second theme of the impact of funding and service contract structures was also apparent, 
especially in the environmental field. Many respondents reported that potentially 
innovative public-private partnerships were created with the remit to ‘do things 
differently’. However, these opportunities were rarely realized because of a over-riding 
focus on avoiding all forms of financial and safety risks, and without consideration of their 
relationship to potential benefits. A particular problem identified was the risk averse 
attitude of project funders. Many projects operated on a ‘minimal financial cushion’, so 
that convincing funders of success was seen as crucial for organisational survival. Funders 
were overwhelmingly characterized as highly risk averse and most interested in ‘good news 
stories’ related to their funding. Again no willingness to learn from innovation failures was 
apparent. 
 
Finally, a strong feature of the UK experience was respondents’ frustration with conflicting 
regulatory risk approaches for PSI. Mental health in particular was subject to multiple 
clinical and governmental regulatory frameworks. Health and social care integration in 
Scotland, for example, was described as a PSI with ‘great opportunities’, but where 
respondents identified a consistent lack of effort from the regulatory bodies to integrate 
multiple and oft-times competing regulatory standards for this large-scale and cross-sector 
PSI. Thus, grass-roots approaches to PSI were stifled by the regulatory requirements of the 
service – even when the innovation itself was government sanctioned (as with Scottish 
health and social care integration).  
 
  
Cross-national comparison 
 Mental health Environmental 
sustainability 
Italy  Mostly local and bottom-
up. Focus on professional 
and employee/’common 
sense’ approaches 
Highly centralized. Focus 
on organizational and 
institutional legitimacy in a 
legalistic and regulatory 
framework 
Netherlands  Mostly bottom-up with little formal risk management 
framework. Focus on maintaining organizational 
legitimacy  using ‘common sense’ approaches 
Slovakia  Top-down regulation by government and dominance of 
public sector. Risk ‘passed up the line’ to senior managers 
and politicians 
UK  Regulation dominated by 
top-down risk management 
by regulators and funders  
Bottom-up and ad-hoc 
approaches dominated by 
‘common sense’  
Table IV. Cross-national comparison 
 
The approaches of each national case study to risk are compared in Table IV. No overall 
pattern is apparent but four themes do recur. First, there is hardly any understanding of risk 
as intrinsic to innovation or of the need to weigh risks against the potential benefits of 
innovation. Second, there is a lack of linkage between top-down and bottom-up approaches 
to risk. They exist independent of each other. The top-down approaches are driven by a 
complex pattern of regulatory and funder-driven frameworks. These are almost wholly risk 
averse – and sometimes conflictual. In contrast, the bottom-up approaches are unsystematic 
and ad-hoc, mostly perceived as simply ‘common sense’ rather than risk management. 
Finally attempts to learn from failed innovations or risks are entirely absent. Risk is 
perceived as something to be minimized rather than acknowledged and resolved and/or 
learned from.  
Discussion and conclusions 
Research implications. This is the first empirical exploration of approaches to risk in PSI. 
It has revealed that risk is a poorly understood concept, both in general and in relation to 
PSI. We found limited appreciation that risk was an inherent part of the innovation process 
or that there was a need to engage with key stakeholders in order negotiate both what was 
understood as a risk for any innovation and/or what levels of risk were acceptable to bear 
for any potential benefit from an innovation. Yet this latter approach is at the heart of the 
risk governance model that currently represents best practice in the field (Renn 2008). 
When the conceptual framework developed previously (Table V) was applied to the data, 
we found a predominance of technocratic and occasionally decisionistic, approaches. 
However no relational risk governance approaches were apparent. Relational risk 
governance by its nature is intensive and more expensive, as Brown & Osborne (2013) 
have observed, and it is not appropriate or necessary for simple innovations. However 
many of the PSIs examined in this study were complex ones with multiple stakeholders to 
be negotiated for their successful implementation. Failure to attend to this relational 
dimension may well have been cheaper in the short term, but undermined fatally the 
likelihood of long-term sustainability for these PSIs.  
 
The import of the findings of this study in relation to our first four research questions are 
also displayed in Table VI, with the fifth research question is dealt with in our final section 
below on policy and practice. Six implications derive from these findings. First we found 
three approaches to risk in public service innovation: a passive ‘non-response, a ‘top-down’ 
approach dominated by regulation (particularly actuarial or health and safety related), and 
a ‘bottom-up’ one dominated by professionals often on an ad-hoc or ‘common sense’ basis. 
On occasions these approaches co-existed but rarely were linkages between the approaches 
made extant. These approaches resonate strongly with Lodge’s (2009) previously 
discussed world-views of risk and innovation as respectively ‘fatalism’, ‘hierarchy’ and 
‘individualism’. His fourth category, of’ egalitarianism’ was not found, yet this resonates 
strongly most strongly with Renn’s ‘transparent risk governance’.  
 
Formal responses included formal hierarchical structures that monitored and evaluated 
innovation processes – though these were almost wholly concerned with risk minimisation 
rather than risk governance.  We also found formal checklists based on regulatory protocols 
in the mental health area (e.g. a process checklist for home visits, based on health and safety 
and mental health care regulations). Mature organisations might also offer formal project 
management training, such as Prince II or Project Management Professional qualifications. 
Informal ad-hoc approaches included diverse responses, such as experienced-based 
training on the job and informal communication, usually based upon pre-existing 
professional networks. However, little evidence was found of consistent attempts to build 
learning loops into the innovation process that might either limit the possibility of iterative 
risk scenarios or learn from these for future iterative developments of PSIs (Kinder 2010).  
 
Table V: Risk approaches by national case studies 
Country/ 
Policy Area 
Mental Health Sustainability 
Italy Technocratic risk 
management & 
evolutionary innovation 
Technocratic risk 
management with 
decisionistic elements & 
mostly evolutionary 
innovation 
Netherlands Technocratic risk 
management  & 
evolutionary innovation 
Decisionistic risk 
management & 
expansionary innovation 
Slovakia Technocratic risk 
management  & 
evolutionary innovation 
technocratic risk 
management  & 
evolutionary innovation 
UK Technocratic risk 
management  & 
evolutionary innovation 
Decisionistic risk 
management with small 
elements of negotiation & 
(mostly) expansionary 
innovation 
Research Question Empirical Evidence 
RQ1: What is the current range of 
approaches to risk in public service 
innovation? 
 
 Mostly hard approaches, with 
occasional/informal ‘soft’ approaches to 
risk management. 
 Dominance of actuarial risk management, 
aiming to minimise risk altogether 
 Negative associations with risk – must be 
avoided rather than managed effectively 
RQ2: What are the key contingencies of PSO 
engagement with risk?  
 
 Size of an organisation 
 Maturity of an organisation 
 Level of higher-level regulation  
 Approach to innovation and risk of 
funders and funding mechanisms 
RQ3: What are the current approaches to 
engaging key stakeholders in discussions 
about appropriate levels of risk for public 
service innovation? 
 
 Mostly absent from cases – some 
evidence of informal engagement in 
newer organisations 
 No identified engagement with services 
users and their significant others 
RQ4: How are these discussions translated 
subsequently into specific risk management 
and governance models? 
 Mostly by management and policy makers 
through formal mechanisms of regulation 
and internal checklists 
Table VI: Empirical Evidence by Research Question. 
 
Second, respondents found it difficult to articulate their conceptions of risk, uncertainty 
and innovation. Frontline staff invariably associated these terms with managerial 
responsibilities. They demonstrated an ability to implement procedural risk management, 
but did not see any role for themselves in negotiating either its meaning or balance against 
benefits. Further, risk was consistently considered as an entirely negative concept rather 
than a necessary component of PSI. Echoing Hood’s (2002) ‘blame game’, risk 
management was thus equated with ‘failure management’ and often occurred only after a 
risk had been identified and as a ‘damage control’ mechanism to avoid personal or 
organisational blame. Risk was also invariably conflated with uncertainty and hence was 
seen as impossible to plan for. Finally innovation was likewise conflated with incremental 
change and improvement, making it hard for PSOs or their staff to identify its distinctive 
challenges compared to such incremental change. 
 
Third and consequently, where it existed, risk management was invariably top-down and 
linked to the need to ensure compliance with regulatory regimes – and in particular when 
risks where seen as falling under regulatory regimes. A strong example of this was the 
integration of health and social care in Scotland, where respondents reported difficulties in 
bringing together the widely differing regulatory regimes and cultures of the health and 
social care organisations involved. Fourth, bottom-up approaches were identified in this 
study, but these were invariably informal and articulated as ‘common sense’ responses to 
‘a problem’, rather than as any active engagement with risk. Nor did we identify any 
organisational mechanisms to support or learn from these informal approaches (Kinder 
2010). 
 
Fifth we identified funding regimes as significant drivers both of innovation and of risk 
management. A conflict was clear here. Funders, and contractual stipulations, often 
favoured PSI – but equally sought to minimise or eradicate the risk involved in such rather 
than to engage with it as a core element of the innovation process. This tension between 
innovation and reputational damage for funders has been noted also in previous research 
(e.g. Osborne 1998). One TSO thus reported that they were awarded funding for an 
innovation project in sustainability, only to find that the funding contract required them to 
abide by all the existing processes the funder had in place, even beyond statutory 
regulation, in order to comply with risk management. Their innovative idea was thus 
diminished to, at best, incremental change from the beginning.  
 
Finally, we found no evidence of risk governance or negotiation based on understanding 
risk as a social construct, with different meanings and implications for different stakeholder 
groups and which required negotiation in terms of levels of risk and the associated potential 
benefits from an innovation. Respondents saw risk as an absolute in mostly financial terms 
and did not acknowledge that there was scope for discussion or even for different 
perceptions. Similarly, the advantage of balancing the potential benefits and risks of PSI 
was entirely absent. Conscious stakeholder engagement to negotiate the meaning and 
appropriate level of risk in relation to benefits was lacking in the other cases. Most 
strikingly, service users were not seen as a key stakeholder group to engage with in 
discussions of risk. 
 
 
Policy and practice implications. This paper has important implications for public policy 
and service management in relation to risk and PSI (RQ 5). It has found current policy and 
practice to be piecemeal and lacking any pervasive understanding either of risk or of its 
relationship to PSI. Risk is viewed in a wholly negative fashion rather than as something 
to be engaged with as an inherent part of innovation. Such a failure to engage can only 
perpetuate a cycle of permanently failing innovation and an inability to learn for the future, 
as well as an enduring waste of public money down an innovation ‘drain’ (Kinder 2000).   
 
The managerial practice evidenced here was dominated by a prevalence of technocratic 
and managerial responses to risk management, invariably driven by the concerns of funders 
or from the requirements of regulatory regimes. There was little active engagement of 
front-line staff in these approaches except to execute pre-determined guidelines or 
checklists. Where they did engage with risk it was expressed at an unconscious level and 
usually as a ’common sense’ response to e service problem. No mechanisms were in place 
to capture and learn from these common sense responses for the future.  
 
No active engagement with service users or their significant others was identified. Key 
stakeholders were identified rather as higher level bodies to be pacified as part of a ‘blame 
avoidance game’ (Hood 2002).. Nowhere was there any appreciation of risk governance or 
the idea that risk should be engaged with and weighed as part of successful innovation 
management. Again this is a fatal flaw that is likely to doom recurrent PSI initiatives to 
failure. The potential for PSOs to learn in the process is minimised in the extreme. 
 
Moving forward, responding to these findings has major implications for the effective 
governance of risk in relation to PSI.  At the most fundamental level this paper has revealed 
that public service staff have little clear understanding of the nature of risk, or of its role as 
an essential component of innovation. This failure is replicated in the attitudes of public 
service funders and regulators. This lack of understanding is undermining significant 
public policy initiatives that are predicated on innovation as the driver of public service 
reform (e.g. DIUS 2008 in the UK). The central lesson therefore is that the research 
community needs to articulate a meaningful discourse about the nature of risk and its 
relationship to innovation to drive forward more nuanced and effective public policy 
making and implementation. The conceptual framework developed as part of this study is 
a start in this process and can offer a realistic framework within which policy makers and 
practitioners can situate risk and PSI. We would argue for five further essential 
prerequisites for enabling a more effectual engagement with risk in public service 
innovation, based around the risk governance approach.  
 
First, PSOs and their senior managers need to embrace a culture within public service 
delivery that accepts that risk is inherent to innovation. To minimise risk is to minimise 
innovation. Rather public service reform needs to proceed upon the basis of active 
engagement with the relationship between risk and innovation at all organisational levels. 
This includes understanding how risk relates to uncertainty, that different modes of risk 
exist and that it can be located in different locus with different implications (author 
reference, 2016). Cultural change is of course notoriously hard within any organization, 
and especially within PSOs because of the confluence of political and organizational 
resistance (Colville et al 1993). Hard is not the same as impossible, though, and to ignore 
this challenge simply risks further public resources being allocated to PSI within a 
framework destined to ensure only minimal, if any, impact. 
 
Second, linked to this, is the necessity to understand that innovation has real costs including 
the risks of failure, undesirable or unintended outcomes and/or financial costs. Failure to 
engage with these costs almost certainly guarantees the failure of the innovation and/or the 
ability to learn from such failure. PSI is complex and involves both political risks and direct 
risks of harm to individuals if innovations fail. This is not a reason not to engage with such 
risk however. In the field of public health, doctors regularly engage with substantial risk to 
patients in a (mostly) negotiated way in order to enhance the efficacy of medical treatment. 
There would be no open heart or heart replacement treatment otherwise, for example. 
However this is but one field where risk is acknowledge as essential to public service 
reform, if articulated in a largely clinical discourse (Mele et al 2014). Such articulation 
requires to be diffused across public service delivery as a whole if innovation is to become 
a successful driver of public service reform.  
 
Third, these two recommendations require far greater engagement of all stakeholders 
(including services users, their significant others, local communities, politicians, and other 
affected PSOs, etc.) in negotiation about the types and levels of risk that are acceptable for 
the promised benefits of a PSI. Risk governance requires seeking agreement about levels 
of acceptable risk for agreed potential outcomes. Failure to engage in such negotiation 
almost certainly will result in opposition and resistance to an innovation and its attendant 
risks – and almost certainly undermine the likelihood of successful innovation. Such 
negotiation is required both across stakeholder groups as well as between PSOs and these 
groups (Osborne & Radnor 2016). 
 
Fourth, such a risk governance approach does not deny the need for adequate risk 
assessment for any innovation. Indeed this is essential to drive forward meaningful risk 
negotiation. However the balance between risk assessment and governance will change 
between different types of innovation. Technocratic and managerial risk approaches, as 
identified by Renn, will still suffice for some simple forms of innovation. To impose 
negotiated risk governance on all would be time consuming, costly and un-necessary. Thus 
a pendant alarm for older people will require technical assessment of its efficacy but is 
likely to engender little need to extensive stakeholder engagement. However the 
introduction of smart homes for older people as part of a community care initiative would 
require far greater risk negotiation and governance. 
 
Fifth, PSOs need to attend to learning within their risk governance strategies. This 
incorporates both learning how to engage with risk in public service delivery and learning 
from risky encounters and/or innovation failures (Aulton 2016). Conceptualising risk as 
something to be minimised or avoided undermines the ability of PSOs to engage with risk 
and learn from it.  The risks that PSOs face in PSI can often include direct risk of personal 
harm or danger to service users, as well as damaging and negative media attention directed 
at individual professionals or PSOs. This is not a reason to avoid it however, but rather to 
acknowledge its complexity – and its necessity for effective public service reform.  
Whether public services can evolve beyond Hood’s ‘blame game’ is a political question 
though, rather than a managerial one. Consequently such change is not required from and 
within PSOs alone. It is required from politicians and public policy makers, as well as from 
the major funding regimes. Indeed the evidence above suggests that changes at this level 
are likely to drive top-down change in approaches to risk within PSOs. This does not negate 
the potential of bottom-up change, but will enable an environment that is conducive to such 
bottom-up approaches.  
 
This is an extremely challenging agenda for political, policy-making, and cultural change 
across public policy making, PSOs and public services delivery. It is not an agenda that 
will be easy, or even cheap, to achieve. However our evidence is that innovation as a route 
to public service reform is currently being undermined by ineffective, or non-existent, 
approaches to engaging with the risks of public service innovation. Not only is this an 
immense waste of the substantial public resources being devoted to such PSI, it is also an 
expensive route to the failure of the reform of public services that is required in order to 
address societal needs in an effective and efficient manner. 
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